"We will encourage more exchanges and interactions among different ethnic groups, helping them remain closely united like the seeds of a pomegranate that stick together, and work jointly for common prosperity and development."
-Xi Jinping
Address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
October 18, 2017
Longtime observers of Chinese politics will note that a meeting of the CCP's Party Congress is a highly coordinated affair. These stilted, predictable events usually confirm what most close observers already know about the state of Chinese politics. They anoint new leadership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. They designate successors to the current leadership. They tout the Party's accomplishments over the past five years, and usually formally announce a five-year economic plan that experts have already forecast.
However, Xi Jinping's administration turned much of the logic upside-down. Xi did not tip his hand towards naming a successor prior to the October 2017 event, laying the groundwork for the constitutional changes that would allow him to abolish term limits later in February 2018. Further, the 19th Party Congress took the dramatic step of enshrining Xi Jinping Thought, alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, as a part of China's guiding ideology. All of these steps hinted at drastic sociopolitical changes, and suggested that Xi's address might actually be more than highly coordinated spectacle.
When Xi did address the Party Congress, he spoke for an exhausting three hours. Jiang Zemin, himself a former president, repeatedly checked his watch, conspicuously yawned, and seemingly fell asleep multiple times during the speech. It was not, as one may guess, a thrilling experience. However, much of Xi's address pointed to an important shift in Chinese politics: Xi Jinping was centralizing his authority, and presenting a sweeping vision for the future. (If you're up for a marathon viewing session of a less than riveting speech, here you go... don't say I didn't warn you:)
As I noted in my last post, a round-up of articles and blog-posts and columns about China's ethnic politics over the last two years, Xi's leadership of the party has ushered in dramatic changes in the way China conducts ethnic politics, and manages relations with ethnic minorities. Remarks like the one featured at the beginning of this post, that assert China's minority groups should be bound together "like the seeds of a pomegranate" may not seem to reveal strong currents in ethnic policy, but upon closer examination hold important significance, and provide a lot of important context to the recent actions of the party-state in dealing with ethnic identity.
In Xi's speech, we can see the contours of a coherent view of ethnic politics from Xi. Tracing the arguments back we can also outline how Xi's enforcement of ethnic policy aligns with a longstanding debate in China's leadership about whether the approach to ethnic identity should be fundamentally differentiationalist or assimilationist. Xi's remarks suggest a strong tilt toward assimilation as a goal and prerogative of the state. Understanding why and how this matters requires a deeper examination of Xi's speech and of the trajectory of ethnic politics since the founding of the PRC.
Starting in 1957, the People's Republic of China systematically catalogued and classified ethnic identity according to a Stalinist system of criteria-- known as the minzu system. In recognizing 56 national peoples, including the ethnic majority Han, the party-state attempts to assert control over what counts as 'official' expression of ethnic identity, and limit the forms that ethnic expression may take. Louisa Schein calls notes that this system allows the party to control ethnic relations while permitting minority ethnic groups to make "permissible displays of difference." The result: highly stylized public displays of minority culture that all celebrate the place of these ethnic groups within the Chinese state. The minority groups receive nominal self-governance in recognized minority autonomous regions (including minority language recognition and representation within the local governing apparatus), and often receive other affirmative action benefits. The party argues that these benefits create a mutually beneficial relationship with the state and drives the economic and social development that leads to common prosperity, and national unity.
In many ways, Xi's pomegranate quote seems like a continuation of the kind of propaganda that the CCP has been pushing for years. Anne Marie Brady wrote about this in 2012. In her study of China's minzu xuanchuan (民族宣传, 'nationality propaganda'), Brady found that the party carved out "go" and "no-go" areas for public discourse around ethnicity. In the realm of acceptable discourse, Brady argued, were descriptions of China's 56 recognized minzu ("nationalities", 民族) as united-- a part of the families of Zhonghua Minzu (中华民族, "Chinese Nationalities"). China's propaganda in public places, especially those which have high ethnic minority populations, often stress this unity and indivisibility of China's national peoples. Frequently these posters invoke inter-ethnic solidarity through minzu tuanjie (民族团结, 'inter-ethnic unity'). Take, for example, the billboard pictured below. It is placed near the predominantly Hui mosque in the majority Tibetan community of Losar/Lusha'er (鲁沙尔) near Kumbum Monastery outside Xining. Each of China's 56 nationalities appear together in joyous celebration as a slogan proclaims, "Minorities can't leave the Han. Han can't leave the minorities. All nationalities are mutually inseparble" (少数民族离不开汉族，汉族离不开少数民族，各民族互相离不开).
In a similar vein, the peppy children's song "Great China" (大中国，Da Zhongguo) by the pop star Gao Feng presents a similar sentiment. In the cheery (not to mention cheesy) lyrics, the song proclaims:
We all have one home, and its name is China! (我们都有一个, 家名字叫中国)
Our brothers and sisters are numerous, and the land is beautiful! (兄弟姐妹都很多, 景色也不错)
The message is so anodyne and that the song has been trotted out on a number of high profile events to drive home the party's message about inclusion and unity. Take, for instance, this recording from the 60th anniversary celebration of the founding of the PRC, in 2009 (beginning at the timestamp 1:14:11):
Xi's rhetoric about pomegranates, though perhaps more poetic than the rather stilted language of the propaganda poster, and definitely less corny than Gao Feng, seems to be not unalike in its rhetoric. The many seeds of the pomegranate are bound together, contained within a single pod. They grow together and bear fruit. Just like the poster, Xi remarks depict the unity of nationalities as a blessing which brings bounty for all. Indeed, it might seem that this rhetoric is more of the same: platitudes and boilerplate language about ethnic unity and striving for common greatness. However, when set in the context of the rest of Xi's remarks and the growing debate over nationality policy within the People's Republic, it is clear that Xi's pomegranate is more than just a trite restatement of the status quo.
While current system has defined China's ethnic policy for much of the last 50 years, there have been numerous efforts to solve China's minzu question. Indeed, the minzu system is not so much a starting point for the creation of ethnic policy, but rather the culmination of a longstanding effort to incorporate minorities into the Chinese state.
The question of how to successfully govern China's diverse population has been rehashed since well before the founding of the current PRC. The Yuan and Qing dynasties both implemented some form of ethnic classification in their governance structures. However, these debates became more intense at end of the late Qing dynasty when Chinese policymakers and intellectuals began to ponder the idea of a Chinese nation-state akin to those of Japan and western Europe. Early conversations overlapped with budding Han Chinese nationalism, resentment at the rule of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, and a desire on the part of many to seek "modernizing" solutions to China's political problems by emulating the west.
As such, the discourse around China at the turn of the 20th century frequently touched on the merits of assimaltive nationalism and Chinese racial identity. Sun Yat-sen, regarded as the father of Republican China, and leader of the anti-Imperial revolution was an early proponent of a Han-centric guozu ('race state', 国族) that encompassed a notion of Chinese civilization that extended beyond Han nationality. James Leibold, in his study on the construction Zhonghua Minzu, remarks that Sun ultimately believed that non-Han would be "smelted together in the same oven" (rongye wei yilu, 融冶为一炉) to create a unified Zhonghua Minzu. Leading intellectuals who followed Sun called for racial unity, or “minzu spirit” (minzu jingshen, 民族精神) in the face of Japanese annexations in north China during the 1930s as a means for increasing the national consciousness and saving the state.
The CCP made the recruitment of minority peoples to join them against the nationalist Guomindang in the Chinese Civil War a crucial component of their war efforts. During the 1930s and 40s, the CCP promised minorities that the party would put an end to “Han Chauvinism” (DaHan Zhuyi, 大汉主义), and offer minorities autonomy under CCP rule as a part of zhonghua minzu. At least in part, offering differentiationalist policy and minority autonomy had roots in the writings of Marx and Lenin on nationality. While Marx expressed his view that national attachment served as a stumbling block for uniting the global proletariat in solidarity, he also noted that national consciousness could be mobilized to spread the values of the revolution. Lenin followed this stream of thought, building the Soviet system of nationalities on the idea that allowing for recognition of national diversity would allow for the dissemination of communist ideas and would eventually result in the withering away of national differences and produce a new, universal, Soviet consciousness. Similar ideological justifications underpin the CCP's pursuit of a system which recognized and promoted national diference. Beyond these ideological grounds, winning over the minority groups in the northwest and southwest regions allowed the Communist Party strategic and tactical advantages in waging war on the KMT.
With the exception of the campaigns of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that treated minority identity as "old culture" rooted in feudal thinking that needed to be smashed in service of creating a new, perfect socialist utopia, the system of recognition and differentiation of ethnic identity has prevailed in China. Since 1978 and the commencement of Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Opening" campaign, the government has given various inducements for citizens to identify as ethnic minorities. While the CCP still thoroughly controls and limits the expression of ethnic identity to pro-regime, patriotic, "safe" forms (and stringently punishes those who step outside of lines of acceptability the party-state draws), the party-state has tolerated-- if not outright promoted--ethnic diversity as a defining feature of a vibrant, multinational China.
Despite these attempts to constrain and control minority ethnic identity, persistent outbreaks of resistance-- most notably in Xinjiang and Tibet-- plague the CCP. Especially over the last two decades, a group of scholars and officials sought to rethink and restructure China's system of ethnic politics. Led by people like Ma Rong, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, this 'second generation' of thinkers on ethnic policy began to call for the abandonment of policies that sponsored ethnic differentiation and instead promoted the idea that assimilation into an overarching Chinese identity should be the foundation of China's ethnic politics. In 2007, Ma wrote, "A nation with good ethnic relations will be able to strengthen the cohesiveness of its citizens continually through positive internal integration, so as to reduce administrative and operational costs, enhance the efficiency of social and economic organizations, and to strengthen its economic power." He continued to advocate for an approach that abandoned the terminology of "nationality" for China's 56 recognized minzu, and called instead for use of the phrase "ethnic group" (族群, zuqun) in order to emphasize the Chinese nation, of which Tibetans, Uyghurs, the Han, etc. were part. Such measures, Ma argues, might downplay divisive ethnic politics, and forestall the ethnic conflicts that could lead to the downfall of the Chinese state. Ma remarks:
The measure of institutionalizing ethnic relations might have both a positive and negative impact. Favourable policies toward disadvantaged groups might improve the situation in ethnic stratification and reduce the structural differences in education, industry, occupation and income among groups. Discriminatory policies towards disadvantaged groups might worsen the situation in ethnic stratification and provoke ethnic tension. In both cases, these policies designed for ethnic groups as a whole will certainly strengthen ethnic identity and consciousness. Under certain historical and social circumstances, policies favourable toward minorities might effectively improve ethnic relations and reduce tensions and promote cooperation, but these policies will certainly not weaken ethnic consciousness or promote integration.
Ma's arguments are controversial but certainly have adherents. Critics accuse Ma of Han-centrism, and argues his policies would be akin to cultural erasure. Proponents of his ideas feel that these are the actions that China ought to take because they are the actions that modern nation-states take.
So where does Xi Jinping enter this debate?
Xi's remarks at the 19th Party Congress suggest that his administration is moving towards a more assimilationist path. Though the rhetoric of ethnicities becoming like the seeds of a pomegranate suggests the idea of differentiated system of individual nationalities under party leadership, further context from Xi's speech points to the path that he will pursue to achieve this kind of national unity. When speaking on subject of the party's role in regulation of religion, Xi declared:
"We will fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religious affairs, uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to socialist society."
The choice of wording here, though seemingly banal, point to very specific conclusions. The notion that China's religions must be "Chinese in orientation" aligns with earlier 2016 remarks that Xi made about the need to "Sinicize" religion. In orienting religious practice toward Chinese practices, the party-state will seek to sweep out any foreign elements that might be corrosive to the party-state's goals. Foreign religions (notably Islam and Christianity) must become Chinese. They must assimilate. The vast preponderance of the Chinese public affected by these changes are China's Muslim minorities (Uyghurs primary among them) and ethnic groups like the Miao within which there are significant Christian enclaves.
Xi continues to state that the party-state will, "foster a Chinese ethos and a readiness to respond to the call of our times, strengthen the guiding role of patriotism, collectivism, and socialism, and see that the people develop an accurate understanding of history, ethnicity, country, and culture." Again, here, Xi points to assimilation. The "proper understanding" of ethnicity Xi speaks of will certainly mean that ethnic identity of minority groups must conform to the standards of the Chinese state. The implication of these remarks is that Chinese identity, Chinese language, Chinese cultural and religious practices should be prioritized. Expressions of culture that fall outside of the party's definitions are, apparently, "inaccurate."
Culture lies at the center of Xi's speech. In particular, he comments on the vital importance of culture for China's continued prosperity. Placing culture in a driving role Xi proclaims:
"Culture is a country and nation’s soul. Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong. Without full confidence in our culture, without a rich and prosperous culture, the Chinese nation will not be able to rejuvenate itself."
The culture that Xi means here is, of course, rooted in a construct traditional "Chinese" civilization. While the invocations of China's "5,000 years of history" often provoke eye-rolls from scholars who, quite reasonably, might express doubts about the continuity and unity of "Chinese civilization" over such a long period of time, the template of "traditional China" provides a template for Xi to build claims of continued sovereignty and affiliation with the current boundaries of China's territory, including Xinjiang and Tibet. Xi made this point clear in his remarks that the core of China's national rejuvenation would draw on China's cultural past:
"Socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is derived from China’s fine traditional culture, which was born of the Chinese civilization and nurtured over more than 5,000 years."
Again, Xi is describing a distinctly Chinese national culture that is overarching and encompasses all ethnicities. The bases for this national culture are rooted in "traditional" culture, but might also be read as Sinicizing. Is there a place for Turkic or Tibetan languages, the Christian or Islamic faiths, in the system of "Socialist Culture with Chinese Characteristics" that Xi describes? Do these cultural types square with a system rooted in neo-Confucian, or Maoist practices? While Xi does not specifically make pronouncements of this type, the idea that culture must be rectified with "correct" interpretations and understandings suggests not. Xi continues to further explain that in the efforts to develop this national culture, Chinese culture must be the base. Xi remarks, "In developing this culture, we must follow the guidance of Marxism, base our efforts on Chinese culture, and take into account the realities of contemporary China and the conditions of the present era."
Xi's China turn on cultural idioms that might be characterized as Han-centric. In invoking traditional Chinese culture, Xi makes it clear that the Chinese national identity that he envisions is one that assimilates ethnic minorities through a Sinicizing process. The repeated emphasis he places on aligning religion and ethnicity with "correct" interpretations of Chinese culture illustrate the subservience of ethnic identities to an overriding Chinese national identity. As if to further tip his hand in this direction, among the changes to the Chinese constitution made in February was a proposal to change mentions of minzu (民族, nationality) to Ma Rong's preferred zuqun (族群, ethnic group).
Why does this matter? When placed against this ideological backdrop, it's quite easy to trace the objectives of the recent crackdowns on religion and ethnicity in Xinjing and elsewhere. The party-state's campaign to end religious education, stop minority language coursework, prohibit religious attire, prevent practice of the faith like Ramadan fasting, stripping inconography (e.g. crescent moon spires, Arabic script) off of public signage, etc. stand as part of an assimilationist push. Foreclosing the "permissible displays of difference" that Schein wrote about to emphasize Chinese language, Chinese culture, and Chinese religious orientations appears to be part of a push to pursue policies along the Ma Rong/assimilationist line.
What the ultimate scope and ends of the campaign might be are as of yet unclear. However, understanding the continued course of ethnic politics in the Xi era requires a consideration of these themes. As we continue to assess the current state of Chinese ethnic politics on this blog, keeping Xi's remarks to the Party Congress in mind will provide illumination and context to real-time events. Stay tuned for more.